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1 Introduction
In this paper, we develop and estimate a dynamic programming model that
allows structural empirical analysis of joint labor market behavior of working
couples in Norway. The empirical analysis is based on working couples in
which husbands are qualied for a subsidized early retirement scheme, AFP1,
in 1997 or 1998.
This study tries to join together two branches of the retirement literature.
In one, various attempts are made to explicitly model the joint retirement
decision within a household. In the other, structural dynamic models of
retirement are specied and estimated for individuals, while ignoring the
retirement decisions and retirement status of their spouse.
Recent studies of retirement behavior have recognized the fact that labor
force status and transitions of older married couples are correlated. An older
individual is more likely to retire if the individuals spouse is retired than
if the spouse is not retired. Similar patterns have been documented in a
number of countries and time periods (Hurd (1990), Coile (2003), Jimenez-
Martin, Labeeaga, and Granado (1999)). Spouses are likely to coordinate
their exits from the labor market for several reasons. Firstly, the labor
market choice of one member may a¤ect the nancial rewards of the other
member through specic tax and social security rules. Secondly, the pref-
erence of one member may be di¤erent with di¤erent labor market status
of the other member, for example, due to the complementarity of leisure
between spouses. Thirdly, there may be correlation across spouses in un-
observed tastes. It has been argued that it is not possible to understand
the retirement decision of one spouse without considering the behavior of
the other (for example Blau (1997), Gustman and Steinmeier (2001) among
others). As a result of these concerns, a growing literature which explicitly
models the joint labor force behavior of older couples has emerged. See for
example, Blau and Rihahn (1999), Gustman and Steinmeier (2000) and An,
Christensen, and Gupta (1999).
However, most of these studies are based on either reduced-form mod-
els or static structural models. As Rust, Buchinsky, and Benitez-Silva
(2003) point out, these models su¤er from two major shortcomings. First,
reduced-form models cannot be used to predict behavioral responses to pol-
1AFP is a Norwegian notation for Avtalefestet Pensjonsordning
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icy changes. Second, static models cannot capture the important dynamic
elements of the retirement decision process. Theoretical life cycle model
framework suggests that the retirement decision making cannot be fully
explained by current income levels (see for example: Feldstein (1974)). Re-
tirement is an intertemporal life cycle decision problem. Uncertainty and
re-optimization based on updated information period by period should be a
natural component of the retirement model. Dynamic models account better
for the sequential nature of retirement process in which the decision makers
adjust their behavior as events unfold. Two strands of dynamic retirement
models can be found in the literature, the dynamic programming model
suggested by Rust (1989) and the option value modelsuggested by Stock
and Wise (1990). In general, the option value modelis less computation-
ally demanding, but may result(s) in a temporarily inconsistent decision
in which the worker ignores the fact as that new information arrives he
will be continually revising his estimate of the optimal departure date t
(Rust (1994)). With the recent progress of simulation methods and com-
puter hardware, more and more empirically tractable dynamic programming
retirement models are specied and estimated, for example, French (2001),
Heyma (2001), Karlstrom, Palme, and Svensson (2003) and Knaus (2002).
However, the focus of those papers has been single agent models.
Empirical studies of joint retirement behavior in a structural dynamic
framework are rare. Christensen and Gupta (1994) introduce a dynamic pro-
gramming model of couplesjoint retirement decisions. Couples are assumed
to maximize a joint household utility function with respect to their retire-
ment decisions. Husbands are found to have at least as strong preferences
for leisure as wives.
In this paper, we model the working couples joint retirement behavior
as a discrete time, discrete choice dynamic programming problem. Each
member of the household is assumed to choose annually between two op-
tions, to continue working or to quit working (retirement, if eligible). Our
approach di¤ers from Christensen and Gupta (1994) in three aspects: First,
instead of simply specifying a household utility function, we assume that
the household retirement behavior is an outcome of a cooperative bargain-
ing process between husband and wife. Second, detailed pension benets
and tax rules are included in the model. This not only makes hypothetical
policy simulations possible, but also helps to accurately describe the budget
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sets corresponding to di¤erent choice behavior. In addition, we also take
into account the dissolution possibility of the decision unit due to either
mortality or divorce.
The model is estimated on Norwegian register data. Our sample consists
of working couples in which the husband qualied for AFP and wife are 50
years or older in 1997 or 1998. The retirement behavior of the couples
is observed annually up to four years. Similar to Karlstrom, Palme, and
Svensson (2003), we have excluded those couples where the wife is observed
taking out disability insurance, mainly due to the di¢ culties of modeling
the eligibility condition of the disability insurance scheme.
The estimation results demonstrate that the behavior is rather well ex-
plained by a model with only measures of economic incentives: wages and
pension benets. The parameters corresponding to the wife are found to
be smaller than their counterparts for the husband in the joint utility func-
tion. It indicates that husbands have higher bargaining power within the
household. In contrast to Christensen and Gupta (1994), we nd that wives
leisure is valued more than their husbandsleisure. A possible explanation
is that wives may be more e¢ cient in household production than husbands.
The next section describes the Norwegian institutional settings. Section
3 introduces the data and looks at the dynamic pattern of the retirement be-
havior for our sample. Section 4 presents our dynamic programming model.
The empirical setting and solution method are discussed in section 5. Sec-
tion 6 reports the estimation results and performs a hypothetical policy
simulation. Section 7 concludes.
2 Institutional Settings
In this section, we provide a short description of the Norwegian Pension
System which is relevant to our study, namely the pubic old age pension
system and the early retirement (AFP) system.
2.1 Public Old Age Pension
The backbone of the retirement system in Norway is a mandatory, dened
benet public pension system, covering all permanent residents, established
in its current form in 1967. The standard retirement age is 67 under this
scheme.
5
A crucial parameter in the system, used for dening contributions as
well as benets, is the basic amount which is referred to as G. This amount
is adjusted by the Parliament once or more times each year, in accordance
with changes in the general income level.
The benets consist of two main components. One component is a min-
imum pension, paid to all persons who are permanently residing in the
country. The minimum pension is the basic amount plus a special sup-
plement pension ST; which is determined by the Parliament together with
the basic pension G. The other component is an earnings based pension.
The level depends on the number of pension earning years and the yearly
pension points. A full earnings based pension requires as a general rule 40
years with income above 1G: In the case of less than 40 pension-earning
years, the pension is reduced proportionally. Pension points are computed
for each calendar year. Each year, earnings exceeding the basic pension is
divided by the basic pension to give pension pointsfor that year. Earnings
above 12 times the basic pension do not give points, and earnings between
6 and 12 times the basic pension (8 and 12 times before 1992) are reduced
to one third before calculating points. For earnings from year 1992 on, the
maximum pension point is 7. The average yearly points over the 20 best
years are calculated as the FPP (nal pension point). A full earnings based
pension is 42 percent of the amount which appears when the basic pension
G is multiplied by FPP. For years prior to 1992 the pension percentage is
45. However, many elderly people have had no possibilities of earning a full
supplementary pension. In consequence, special transitional provisions have
been introduced regarding people born before 1937. The detailed rules can
be found in Haugen (2000).
In short, the old age pension is calculated using the following formula:
Y = bG+max(G  FPP  (0:45T1 + 0:42min(T2; PY   T1))
PY
; ST ): (1)
where T1 is the number of years with pension points greater than 0 before
1992, and T2 is the number of years with pension point greater than 0 after
1992. b = 1 if spouses income is less than 2G, b = 0:75 otherwise.
PY =
8><>:
20 if born before 1918,
20 + birth year -1917 if born between 1918-1936,
40 if born after 1936.
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2.2 Early Retirement (AFP)
An early retirement scheme was introduced in 1989 as a result of the wage
negotiations between trade unions and major employers in 1988. People
covered by it have an opportunity to retire earlier than 67 with a pension
as if they continued working with their normalearnings up to age 67.
The scheme covers the whole public sector and part of the private sector.
In order to be eligible an individual must be employed in a company covered
by the scheme and meet certain individual requirements2. Now the AFP
scheme covers about 65-70% of the labor force.
From January 1 1989, the AFP age was 66. It was lowered to 65 from
January 1 1990, to 64 from October 1 1994, to 63 on from October 1 1997
and to 62 from March 1 1998.
The pension level calculations under AFP scheme are aimed to provide
the same pension benets as if pensioner would continue to work until the
ordinary retirement age instead of retiring early. The AFP pension is the
sum of two parts. The rst part is main component of AFP benet, and is
calculated using the same formula (1) as if AFP retiree had worked until age
67. This implies that the pension points in the years between the AFP eligi-
bility age and 67 should be forecasted with some mechanism. The agreement
is to use the maximum between the average of the last three earned points
and FPP to substitute the unrealized points from the futureyears. The
second part is a supplement lump sum amount which is decided annually
similar to the basic pension G.
3 Data
The analysis draws on data at the Frisch Centre, which are merged ad-
ministrative registers. The original data have been received from Statistics
Norway, and are held by the Frisch Centre with permission for research use.
The data give an account of the main labor market activity for virtually the
whole Norwegian adult population. Detailed income information is available
from 1993, while the accumulated pension rights (annual pension points) are
available back to 1967 from the pension register.
We concentrate our study on working couples, i.e. the couples where
2The detailed requirements can be found in Haugen (2000)
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Probability
Age
Figure 1: Observed Retirement Hazard and Survival Rate by Age: Husbands
both husband and wife are active in the labor market prior to the initial
time period. There are two reasons for this. On one hand, the share of dual
earner households is increasing, mostly due to the fact that the labor force
participation for elderly women has increased dramatically in most western
countries. In Norway, the participation rate for women aged 55-66 rose from
40% in 1972 to 54% in 1997 (Dahl, Nilsen, and Vaage (2003)). On the other
hand, our study treats the couples retirement decision as an optimization
problem, which begins at a point in the middle of their life cycle. Restricting
our sample to couples who are both working prior to the initial time period
helps us to eliminate the variation of the initial conditions.
Our sample contains all working couples which satisfy three criteria: (i)
the husband is qualied for AFP in 1997 or 1998. (ii) the wife is at least 50
years old at the year husband is qualied for AFP. (iii) none of members is
known to take out disability pension during our observation period. When
we impose all these criteria, we are left with a sample of 2081 households.
We track the retirement behavior for all individuals in the data set on an
annual basis for 4 years.
We are interested in the transition patterns into retirement by age. Fig-
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Figure 2: Observed Retirement Hazard and Survival Rate by Age: Wives
ure (1) and (2) give pictures of transition pattern in the form of retirement
hazard and survival rate for the relevant age interval for husband and wife
separately. Limited information can be seen from the pattern for the hus-
bands, mainly due to the limited age interval. However, the age retirement
hazard for wives is double peaked at 62 and 67. These peaks are correspond-
ing to the early and normal retirement ages respectively.
4 A Dynamic Programming Model of Joint retire-
ment
In this section, we develop a dynamic programming model for couplesjoint
retirement decisions.
Let t be the discrete time index, with t = 1 as the initial time period in
our analysis, and t = T is upper bound of the planning horizon, which is
dened in section 4.2.
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4.1 Decision variables
In each period, the couples choose whether or not to stay in the labor force.
Let dtm = 1 if the husband chooses to take retirement; and d
t
m = 0 otherwise.
Similarly, we let dtf = 1 if the wife chooses not to work. The decision
variables will be dt = fdtm; dtfg:
An individual who takes out retirement (both early and old age) is not
allowed to return to labor force. For the wife who is not qualied to either
old age or early retirement pension, she can still choose not to work. In
this situation, she will enjoy the same leisure as retirement but with pension
income as 0 until she reaches the old age pension eligibility age 67. Moreover,
we assume that she is not allowed to come back to labor force once she
decides to stop working. This assumption may seem to be restrictive. But
when we look at the data, we see that none of wives who quit their jobs
without eligibility to any pension benets returns to the labor force later.
Under this assumption, the joint retirement decision problem is essen-
tially a two-dimensional optimal stopping problem.
4.2 Mortality Risk, Divorce and Planning Horizon
Our decision unit, the two-member household, may dissolve due to either
the death of any member or a divorce/separation.
We do not treat divorce as a choice, but rather as a result of an exogenous
stochastic process just like mortality. The divorce probability is assumed to
be the same as the national average divorce rate of wifes age group3. The
mortality rate is also considered to be exogenous and equal across sample
given gender and age. A better treatment will be to link the health condition
to the mortality rate, as Rust and Phelan (1997) did. However, in our
study, we have only incomplete data on the health status, which makes the
estimation of a health related mortality risk system infeasible.
The probability that the household does not dissolve at period t can
then be calculated as t = (1   Mft )(1   Mmt )(1   t) where Mkt (k =
m; f) is the gender age specic mortality risk, and t is the divorce rate.
In fact, 1   t can be seen as the hazard of household dissolution, and
it is a function of both husbands and wifes age. Figure (3) illustrates the
3 In year 1997, the divorce rate for women of age 55-59 is 0.4%, and 0.25% for those
of age 60-64. (Source, Population statistics. Divorces and separations, SSB (2002))
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Figure 3: household dissolution hazard and survival rate
household dissolution hazard and survival rate for the household where both
members are of age 62 at the initial time period.
Since it is di¢ cult to model the behavior of the household after it dis-
solves, we assign a constant terminal value to these cases as Blau and
Gilleskie (2001) did. We denote it as Va. In our model the choice of labor
market does not inuence the mortality rate and probability of a divorce, so
the magnitude of the terminal value does not play any role in our analysis.
However, we cannot drop the mortality risk and divorce probability in our
model, because they do have an e¤ect on the choice probability in combina-
tion with the discount factor : The detailed proof of this point is given in
section 5.3.
The individuals are assumed to die with probability one at age 90. It im-
plies that the planning horizon T will be dened as T = 91 max(age1m; age1f );
where age1m and age
1
f is the age for husband and wife at the initial period
t = 1:
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4.3 The Preferences
The preferences for husband and wife at time t are specied as U tm =
Um(s
t; dt; ) and U tf = Uf (s
t; dt; ) respectively, where st is a vector of house-
hold state variables at period t , dt is the couples decision variables dened
above, and  is a vector of preference parameters to be estimated, but known
to the individual.
Denote the discount factor as , we dene LU tm and LU
t
f as the dis-
counted remaining life timeutilities of husband and wife respectively:
LU tm = U
t
m + E(
PT
=t+1 
 tU m);
LU tf = U
t
f + E(
PT
=t+1 
 tU f ):
(2)
Similar to Mastrogicacomo, Alessie, and Lindeboom (2002) and Maes-
tas (2001), we model the couples retirement decision as an outcome of a
cooperative bargaining process. At each period t 2 f1; 2;   T   1g; the
couple is assumed to maximize a collective household utility function LU t
with respect to the decision variable dt. The collective utility function is a
weighted sum of the remaining life timeutilities of the husband and the
wife :
LU t = LU tm + (1  )LU tf : (3)
Following Maestas (2001), Browning and Chiappori (1998),  measures
the husbands decision-making control in the household. If  = 1, the
household behaves as if the husband has exclusive decision-making control,
whereas  = 0 implies that the wife has exclusive control. In the present
study,  is assumed to be constant over time for the same couple, and is not
a¤ected by the retirement decision.
Let U t be the weighted sum of the single period utility function of the
husband and the wife with weight as  and 1  :
U t(st; dt; ; ) = U tm(s
t; dt; ) + (1  )U tf (st; dt; ): (4)
The optimization facing the couples can then be written as
max
dt
(LU tm + (1  )LU tf ) (5)
= max
dt
(U t + E(
XT
s=t+1
s tU t)): (6)
12
It shows that if we assume that the members expectations on future
events are the same, we could treat the couple as the decision unit with
a single period joint utility function U t. This enables us to use the single
agent dynamic programming framework developed by Rust (1989).
4.4 Choice Probabilities and Likelihood Function
As econometricians, we are not able to observe the full set of state vari-
ables. Following Rust (1989), the state variables are partitioned into two
components, st = (xt; "t): At time t; xt can be observed by both the econo-
metrician and the decision maker, while "t is only observed by the decision
maker. This assumption leads to a random utility framework. The single pe-
riod joint utility function for the couple can then be written U t(st; dt; ; ) =
ut(xt; dt; ; ) + "t(dt):
Let p(xt+1jxt; dt; p) represent the couples subjective belief of future
events, which is a probability distribution of the state variables at t + 1
given their observed values and current decision at period t. p is a vector of
parameters related to the subjective belief, which are known to the couples.
For a state variable which follows a deterministic dynamic process, such
as the husbands age, the corresponding distribution degenerates to a mass
point.
Although from the decision makers point of view the optimal decision
rule is deterministic, it is random for econometricians. We can at most
only obtain a conditional choice probability Prt(dtjxt; ; ; ) as in the static
discrete choice framework.
Assume that error term "t is i:i:d: extreme value distributed across
choices and periods, Rust (1994) shows that, for t < T :
Pr t(d
tjxt; ; ; p; ) = exp(vt(d
t; xt; ; ; p; ))X
d02D(xt)
exp(vt(d0; xt; ; ; p; ))
: (7)
where vt(dt; xt; ; ; p; ) is the expected valuation function, which is
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dened as
vt(d
t; xt; ; ; p; )) = ut(d
t; xt; ; )
+ t
Z
log[
X
d02D(xt)
exp(vt+1(d
0; xt+1; ; ; p; )]dp(xt+1jxt; dt; p)
+ (1  t)Va:
(8)
Here D(xt) is the available choice set at t+1 given current states variable
xt.
To sum up, the couples behavior depends on the discount factor , the
joint preference U t and the subjective transition probability p(xt+1jxt; dt; p):
If we observe panel data fxti; dtig for i = 1; 2; :::N , t = 1; 2;    ; Ti, we
can estimate the model using a two-stage procedure which is often followed
in the literature, see for example Rust and Phelan (1997) and Karlstrom,
Palme, and Svensson (2003). In the rst step, the transition probability
p(xt+1jxt; dt; p) is estimated using available data. Then we solve (8) by
backward induction from terminal period T , calculate the choice probability
(7) accordingly, and construct the likelihood function as follows:
L(; ; ) =
NY
i
TiY
t=1
Pt(d
t
ijxti; ; ; ): (9)
5 Empirical Specications
In the current analysis, we make the assumption that there is no heterogene-
ity across the households. In other words, we assume that the parameters in
the individual utility functions, the bargaining parameter  and the discount
parameter  are constant across di¤erent households.
5.1 State Variables
There are totally eleven state variables for each couple. Among them, ve
for husband Xtm = (age
t
m; wage
t
m; benefit
t
m; Z
t
m; L
t
m), and six state variables
for wife Xtf = (age
t
f ; wage
t
f ; benefit
t
f ; Z
t
f ; L
t
f ; e
t).
agetk denotes the age of member k at time t. wage
t
k is the wage earnings
if member k is working at time t. benefittk is the (potential) pension income.
Similar to Christensen and Gupta (1994), we use a variable Ztk denotes
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the retirement date, which is dened as the following:
Ztk =
(
date of retirement if member k retires at t or earlier, and
w if member k continues to work at t.
Ztk takes value from the set f1; 2;    t; wg: This state variable summarizes
the whole decision sequence up to t. For example, Z3m = 2 means that the
husband retires at period 2; and corresponds to a decision sequence fd1m =
0; d2m = d
3
m = 1g: Instead Z3m = w means that the husband is still working
at t = 3, and corresponds to a decision sequence fd1m = d2m = d3m = 0g4.
Ltk is the leisure enjoyed by the member k, L
t
k = 1 if and only if Z
t
k  t.
et is the retirement eligibility indicator for wife, et = 1 if she is eligible
for AFP or ordinary retirement at t; and et = 0 otherwise.
Health is considered to be a very important factor for retirement decision.
Unfortunately, it is a variable which is di¢ cult to measure. Unlike the HRS
data for United States, there is no variable representing the individual health
information. The closest thing we can get is the sick leave days reported
to the authority. Naturally, these data are not available to those who are
retired. So we are not able to observe the dynamic of the health status,
neither can we make any estimation of it. Thus, the health condition is not
included in our analysis.
5.1.1 The Dynamics of the State Variables
Some of the state variables, in their nature, are deterministic and follow a
predetermined path, such as age at period t, agetk.
For the labor market status, we assume that the individuals have perfect
control. The decision variable sequence fdk;  = 1;    tg completely denes
the retirement dates for the couple Ztk: Once Z
t
k is determined, the leisure
enjoyed by member k; Ltk follows immediately by denition.
For the early retirement, old age pension rules, we assume that the indi-
viduals correctly anticipate the changes of the social security rules over the
whole period 1997-2001, but maintain the static expectation that no fur-
ther changes will occur thereafter. This assumption is similar to the semi-
rationalexpectation assumption in Rust (1989). The same assumption is
4Note that these two variables Ztm and Z
t
f are well dened only when the retirement
states are absorbing.
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Husbands Wives
Variable Parameter Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
constant !^1 3.516 5.03 1.187 0.59
log(waget) !^2 0.951 0.005 0.928 0.005
age !^3 -0.088 0.15 -0.008 0.019
age2 !^4 6.8e-4 1.2e-3 7.9e-5 1.6e-4
R2 0.93 0.85
^2 9.2e-4 9.8e-3
Number of observations 2564 5655
Table 1: Estimation results for wage regression equations, husbands and
wives
made for the tax rules.
The social security eligibility variable for wife, et, can not be treated
as exogenous for the reason that AFP eligibility is also conditional on past
labor market behavior. However, once the past decisions are given, it can
be calculated using the social security rules with certainty.
As we see in section 2, retirement benet benefitkt is closely related to
the past wage earnings. There will be no uncertainty in expected early
retirement and old age pension incomes once the wage income history is
given. These incomes can be imputed in detail by the existing rules.
Thus, accurate modeling of wage dynamic is crucial for us to obtain
successful estimates for the dynamic programming model. Similar to Rust,
Buchinsky, and Benitez-Silva (2003), Knaus (2002) and Karlstrom, Palme,
and Svensson (2003), we specify a mis-specied log normal regression of
the individualsannual wage income as the following:
log(waget+1) = !1 + !2 log(wage
t) + !3age
t + !4(age
t)2 + t; (10)
where aget denotes age, and t are i:i:d normal distributed with mean 0 and
variance 2 : The quadratic specication allows for an age income prole.
The regression is done separately for husbands and wives. Table (1)
shows the results from the estimation of this model.
While these regressions need not correspond to the true process gov-
erning the wage dynamic, the estimated regressions for both husband and
wife have quite high R2; and the estimated variances of the error terms are
very small, as seen in table (1). This indicates the low variability of the
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flog(waget)g sequences. Thus, we are able to use a deterministic Markov-
ian updating formula with quite high precision to impute the wage income
at period t+ 1 based on the wage income of period t:
waget+1 = exp(!^1 + !^2 log(wage
t) + !^3age
t + !^4(age
t)2 + ^2=2): (11)
This nding is highly encouraging. First, a deterministic wage dynamic
will allow us to carry the whole history of wages and give a precise pen-
sion calculation without incurring the problem of curse of dimensionality.
More important, a deterministic wage dynamic essentially makes the whole
subjective belief system of the state variables deterministic, which greatly
reduces the numerical complexity of the model implementation.
5.2 Utility Function
Disposable income for spouse k, ytk is dened as
ytk = wage
t
k  (1  Ltk) + Ltk  benefittk   Taxtk;
where wagetk is the annual wage income, benefit
t
k is the annual pension
income respectively for spouse k at time t5. Taxtk is the tax paid by spouse
k at time t6.
The utility functions are specied as follows:
U tm = u
t
m + "
t
m = m1 log(y
t
m) + m2 log(y
t) + m1L
t
m + m2L
t
f + "
t
m;
U tf = u
t
f + "
t
f = f1 log(y
t
f ) + f2 log(y
t) + f1L
t
f + f2L
t
m + "
t
f :
(12)
According to this specication, m1; f1 measure the contribution of eco-
nomic incentives to the utility. Income or consumption sharing is captured
by the e¤ect that yt = ytm + y
t
f . The  parameters measure the utility of
leisure. By letting the spouses leisure to enter his/her utility function, we
allows for the individuals preference to be altruisticand the existence of
caring within the household.
We expect that all these parameters to be non-negative, for the utility
5For wives who are not eligible to any pension scheme, we intend to set the benet as
0. However, due to numerical concerns, a very small number is given instead.
6Detailed Norwegian tax rules are used when calculating the tax. The unit of tax
calculation is the couple, not the individual, which means that the taxes paid by the
couple depend on the labor market status of both members of the household.
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function should generally be a increasing function of both income and leisure.
However, given the setting of the model, similar to Mastrogicacomo,
Alessie, and Lindeboom (2002), we are not able to identify the bargaining
parameter  separately from the other parameters, since we can only esti-
mate the parameters in the joint weight utility U t = U tm + (1  )U tf 7. In
fact, using (12), we see that
U t = m1 log(y
t
m) + (1  )f1 log(ytf ) + (m2 + (1  )f2) log(yt) (13)
+(m1 + (1  )f2)Ltm + ((1  )f1 + m2)Ltf + ("tm + (1  )"tf )
= m log(y
t
m) + f log(y
t
f ) +  log(y
t) + mL
t
m + fL
t
f + "

t
= ut(ytm; L
t
m; y
t
f ; L
t
f ) + "

t :
We can only identify m; f ; ; m; f : Similar to the individual utility
case, we expect that all these parameters to be non-negative. The parame-
ters for leisure might be related to the age of the member. It has been found
in several studies that it is appropriate to use a age-leisure preference prole
that is rather fast increasing in certain age interval (Karlstrom, Palme, and
Svensson (2003) and Heyma (2001), among others). So we let
k = exp(k;1) + exp(k;2)
exp(
agetk k;3
k;4
)
1 + exp(
agetk k;3
k;4
)
: (14)
The joint error term "t = "tm+(1 )"tf is assumed to be i:i:d: extreme
value distributed.
Note that from the above section 5.1.1, we see that for any given couple,
both leisure variables Ltk and disposable incomes (y
t
m; y
t
f ) depend only on
possible retirement dates (Ztm; Z
t
f ): So the deterministic part of the single
period joint utility function ut(ytm; L
t
m; y
t
f ; L
t
f ) in (13) can be written as
ut(Ztm; Z
t
f ):
7An elaborately designed non-linear relationship between the parameters and couple
specic variables such as age, wealth etc might ensure the identication of the bargaining
power parameter : However, this identication will fully hinge on the functional form of
these relationships, which might be wrong. This is also the reason why we specify the
age varying prole of leisure preference in the joint utility function (13) but not in the
individual utility function (12).
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5.3 Solving the Dynamic Programming Model
5.3.1 Expected Valuation and Choice Probability
As we discussed in last section, we can denote the single period joint utility as
ut(Ztm; Z
t
f ):Using (8), we can write the expect value function vt(d
t; xt; ; ; )
as vt(Ztm; Z
t
f ).
The expected valuation function vt(Ztm; Z
t
f ) can be calculated using the
following formula.
Note that Ztk can take value from the set f1; 2;    t; wg; then we have for
h; j 2 f1; 2;    tg;
vt(h; j) = u
t(h; j) + t+1vt+1(h; j) + (1  t+1)Va ; (15)
vt(h;w) = u
t(h;w) + (1  t+1)Va
+ t+1 ln[exp(vt+1(h;w)) + exp(vt+1(h; t+ 1))];
(16)
vt(w; j) = u
t(w; j) + (1  t+1)Va
+ t+1 ln[exp(vt+1(w; j)) + exp(vt+1(t+ 1; j))];
(17)
vt(w;w) = u
t(w;w) + (1  t+1)Va
+ t+1 ln[
P
(h0;j0)2fw;tgfw;tg exp(vt+1(h
0; j0))]:
(18)
Moreover, the available choice set at current period also depends solely
on the retirement status at last period (Zt 1m ; Z
t 1
f ): It can be written as
D(xt 1) =
8>>>><>>>>:
fw; tg  fw; tg if Zt 1m = Zt 1f = w;
fw; tg  fZt 1f g if Zt 1m = w;Zt 1f  t  1;
fZt 1m g  fw; tg if Zt 1m  t  1; Zt 1f = w;
f(Zt 1m ; Zt 1f )g if Zt 1m  t  1; Zt 1f  t  1:
Under the assumption that "t is i:i:d: extreme value distributed, we can
rewrite the choice probability (7) at time t in detail as follows:
If Zt 1m  t  1; Zt 1f  t  1; both members have retired when entering
time t, then we have
Pr t(Z
t 1
m ; Z
t 1
f ) = 1: (19)
If Zt 1m  t  1; Zt 1f = w; the husband has already retired, but the wife
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is still working when entering time t, then
Pr t(Z
t 1
m ; w) =
exp(vt(Z
t 1
m ; w))
exp(vt(Z
t 1
m ; w)) + exp(vt(Z
t 1
m ; t))
; (20)
Pr t(Z
t 1
m ; t) =
exp(vt(Z
t 1
m ; t))
exp(vt(Z
t 1
m ; w)) + exp(vt(Z
t 1
m ; t))
:
If Zt 1m = w;Z
t 1
f  t   1; the husband is working, but the wife has
already retired when entering time t, we have
Pr t(t; Z
t 1
f ) =
exp(vt(t; Z
t 1
f ))
exp(vt(w;Z
t 1
f )) + exp(vt(t; Z
t 1
f ))
; (21)
Pr t(w;Z
t 1
f ) =
exp(vt(w;Z
t 1
f ))
exp(vt(w;Z
t 1
f )) + exp(vt(t; Z
t 1
f ))
:
If Zt 1m = w;Z
t 1
f = w; both husband and wife are working when entering
time t; we have for all (h; j) 2 fw; tg  fw; tg
Pr t(h; j) =
exp(vt(h; j))P
(h0;j0)2fw;tgfw;tg exp(vt(h0; j0))
: (22)
5.3.2 The Solution Method
The model is solved using backward induction.
Given the fact that age 70 is the mandatory retirement age in Norway,
no choice on labor market will be available after the younger member of the
household turns into 70. Denote this period as t = T : The solution of
the dynamic programming problem after T  is trivial, since there will be no
choice available for the couples.
We start our backward induction at T : For any possible retirement dates
for the couple (h; j); the expected valuation function at T  is then:
vT (h; j) =
XT
=T 
 t
Y t
k=1
t+k  uT (h; j) +AVa: (23)
where A is a constant which depends on discount factor  and the period
specic household dissolution probabilities 1   t: Va is the terminal value
when household dissolves:
It follows immediately from (15) to (23) that the expected value func-
tions can be calculated as four one-dimensional backward recursions. The
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parameters Full model Constant Leisure S.E.
m 0.49635 0.49635 0.09831
f 0.03118 0.03118 0.00177
 0.91808 0.91808 0.13413
m;1 -1.01068 -0.03140 0.04484
m;2 -0.50234 - -
m;3 44.96211 - -
m;4 0.00023 - -
f;1 -0.57702 -0.57701 0.08939
f;2 -1.72009 - -
f;3 143.21462 - -
f;4 0.00001 - -
Log-likelihood -4196.1
McFadden R2 37.35%
Number of households: 2081;  = 0:95
Table 2: Results from Maximum Likelihood Estimation
structure is similar to Christensen and Gupta (1994).
Another insight we can gain from (15) to (23) is that the terminal value
Va will cancel out when we calculate the choice probability so we could
simply normalize it to zero. Both the mortality and the divorce probability
enter into the model in conjunction with the discounting factor :
6 Estimation results and Policy Simulation
6.1 A Technical Note on Estimation
The numerical optimization of the logarithm of the likelihood function (9)
is not straight forward. To cope with this complex problem, a group of
gradient and non-gradient optimization methods are used. First, a genetic
algorithm procedure is applied to obtain the initial starting values. Then
we use the iterated downhill simplex method. After the simplex method
converges, a gradient method is implemented by using the estimates from
the simplex method as starting values.
6.2 Estimation Results
We estimate all parameters in (13) and (14), namely the parameters related
to incomes m; f ; ; and the age-leisure prole parameter k;1; k;2; k;3; k;4
21
Probability
Age
Figure 4: Comparison of observed, predicted and simulated survival rate for
husbands.
(k = m; f).
The rst column of table (2) shows the estimation results of all 11 para-
meters. All estimates have the expected sign. However, a very interesting
point to note is that, for both husband and wife, the resulting function of
the preference for leisure (14) is a constant for all relevant age interval. The
estimates suggest that the changes in preferences by age are small. Thus
a model without allowing for preferences to change over time is su¢ cient
for our data. The second column in table (2) shows the estimates of such
a model, and the standard errors of these estimates are reported in column
38.
From the estimates, we see that both parameters corresponding to the
wife have much smaller magnitude when compared with their counterparts
for the husband. Namely f < m and f;1 < m;1: It could be a sign which
indicates that the wives have lower bargaining power than their husbands,
which is not surprising for the cohorts studied in our analysis. Interestingly,
8 It is neither possible nor necessary to report the standard error for estimates in
column 1.
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Probability
Age
Figure 5: Comparison of observed, predicted and simulated survival rate for
wives.
in contrast to Christensen and Gupta (1994), our estimates suggest that
wivesleisure is valued much higher in the household than their husbands
leisure. We think this is consistent to the view that wives are more e¢ cient
in household production than husbands. On the other hand, we notice that
the parameter for the joint income  is higher than the sum of f and m;
which shows that the joint income is valued higher than individual income
for both husband and wife.
The tting of the model is satisfactory. The McFadden R2 is 37.3 per
cent, which is fairly high in non-transportation literature. Figure (4) and
(5) show the observed and predicted cumulative probability of remaining in
labor force (the survival rate) by age for husbands and wives respectively.
Table (3) lists the retirement hazard rates by age for both husbands and
wives.
As we can see from gure (4) and (5) and table (3), our model replicates
the retirement pattern fairly well. The tting for wives seem to be better
than that for husbands. Our suspicion is that it might have something to
do with the fact that we have rather limited age interval for husbands in our
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wife husband
age observed predicted simulation observed predicted simulation
52 0.008 0.003 0.002
53 0.010 0.003 0.002
54 0.007 0.002 0.001
55 0.000 0.001 0.000
56 0.004 0.001 0.001
57 0.005 0.001 0.001
58 0.003 0.002 0.001
59 0.003 0.004 0.003
60 0.004 0.013 0.009
61 0.019 0.050 0.038
62 0.264 0.215 0.193 0.423 0.352 0.320
63 0.193 0.181 0.166 0.332 0.279 0.259
64 0.107 0.148 0.139 0.125 0.170 0.166
65 0.099 0.128 0.122 0.069 0.105 0.108
66 0.104 0.142 0.136 0.004 0.093 0.103
67 0.360 0.185 0.183
68 0.220 0.200 0.204
Table 3: Retirement Hazards by Age
analysis. An important criterion for evaluation of retirement models is the
ability of replicating the hazard spikes. In gure (2), we see there are two
retirement peaks for wives, which are at age 62 and 67 respectively. From
table (3) we see that our model successfully predicts that rst retirement
peak for wives at age 62 but misses the second peak at 67. The missing of the
second peak might be due to the fact that there are quite few observations
in our sample with wives of age 67 or older so that the maximum likelihood
estimator attaches little weight to accurately predict the retirement behavior
of this age group9.
6.3 Policy Simulation
In order to illustrate the magnitude of the estimated relationship and the
corresponding impact of potential policy changes, we have simulated the
e¤ect of a hypothetical policy reform based on the estimated model. The
tax system in Norway strongly favors retirement (Hernæs, Sollie, and Strøm
(2000)). Figure (6) shows the amount of tax to pay for a married individual
9This point is taken from Karlstrom, Palme, and Svensson (2003).
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Figure 6: Tax from Labor Income and AFP Pension Income, married indi-
vidual with working spouse, 1998
with a working spouse in 1998 from di¤erent income sources. For yearly
earnings around 160,000 NOK, the tax for AFP pension income is around
20 per cent (8,000 NOK) lower than that for labor income. In the policy
simulation, we make the tax system less generous to the pension benets 
pension benets will be taxed the same way as labor earnings.
The policy simulation results are shown in gure (4), (5) and table (3).
As we expected, this hypothetical policy clearly reduces the retirement haz-
ard before age 65 for both husbands and wives. The model predicts a reduc-
tion of the hazard rate at the AFP eligibility ages (62 and 63 in our sample)
by around 0.02. Similar results have been found in Hernæs, Jia, and Strøm
(2001). However, the magnitude of the reductions we nd here is smaller
than that of Hernæs, Jia, and Strøm (2001) (typically 0.05-0.07). Of course,
this might be simply due to cohorts e¤ect since these two studies are based
on di¤erent data. We also notice that the relative reduction of the retire-
ment hazard (Hs   Hp)=Hp, where Hs is the hazard rate after simulation
and Hp is the predicted hazard rate, generally decreases with age. This is
consistent with the fact that older individuals normally have less to lose due
to the restriction of compulsory retirement age.
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In short, this hypothetical policy reform increases the labor participation
rate for both husband and wife by around 4 percentage points at the age of
65. Although the e¤ects are not as strong as reported in previous literature,
this policy is still a good candidate for the purpose of counteracting the
negative e¤ects on labor supply implied by the early retirement programs.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a dynamic programming model for joint house-
hold retirement behavior that acknowledges the institutional features of the
Norwegian Social Security and Tax system. The model is then estimated on
a sample of Norwegian working couples in which the husband qualied for a
special early retirement scheme in 1997 or 1998. The model provides fairly
well within sample predictions of labor force participation rates.
Interestingly, for both husband and wife, the estimated function of the
preference for leisure is a constant for all relevant age interval. It suggests
that the changes in preferences by age are rather little.
We nd that the parameters corresponding to the wife have smaller nu-
merical magnitude when compared with their counterparts for the husband
in the joint utility function. This can be a sign of unbalanced bargaining
power within the household. In contrast to Christensen and Gupta (1994),
we nd that wivesleisure is valued more than their husbandsleisure, which
is consistent with the view that wives are more e¢ cient in household pro-
duction than husbands.
A hypothetical policy simulation is performed using the estimates of the
model. In the simulation, pension benets are taxed the same way as labor
earnings. It increases the labor supply for both husband and wife by around
4 percentage points at the age of 65.
As a rst step to develop a fully dynamic model for analyzing the joint
retirement behavior of Norwegian couples, the present study inevitably has
some limitations. The most important limitation is that we do not model the
savings behavior of the household. A more realistic dynamic programming
model should include also wealth accumulation and allow for the consump-
tion/savings decision as the single agent model in French (2001). Another
limitation is that we are not able to model disability pension scheme in our
analysis. So in the current analysis, an important path way out of the labor
26
force is excluded. Further research is required to resolve these problems.
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